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INTRODUCTION

On February 27, 1986, John Demjanjuk was flown to Israel to
stand trial for allegedly committing crimes against humanity during
the Second World War. Demjanjuk is accused of murdering
thousands of Jews and others at the Treblinka death camp in Poland.
If convicted, Demjanjuk faces a possible death sentence under Israeli
law. 1
The Demjanjuk case began in 1977 when the U.S. government
initiated denaturalization proceedings against Demjanjuk, based on his
alleged illegal procurement of an immigration visa in the early 1950S.2
Following its usual practice in the case of alleged war criminals, the
government sought to revoke Demjanjuk's U.S. citizenship and deport
him. 3 The case changed course in 1983, however, after Israel
requested that the United States extradite Demjanjuk to Israel to
stand trial for crimes against humanity. The request to extradite
Demjanjuk marked the first time that Israel had asked the United
4
States to turn over an alleged Nazi war criminal.
Chief Judge Frank J. Battisti of the Northern District of Ohio
certified Demjanjuk's extradition to Israel in April, 1985. Both the
District Court and the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals denied
Demjanjuk's subsequent petition for a writ of habeas corpus; the
Supreme Court then denied Demjanjuk's petition for certiorari on
February 24, 1986.5 The Supreme Court's denial of certiorari
removed the final obstacle to Demjanjuk's extradition.
1. N.Y. Times, Feb. 28, 1986, at A10, col. I. Presentation of evidence in Demjanjuk's
trial began in Jerusalem on February 16, 1987. N.Y. Times, Feb. 17, 1987, at A3, col. 4.
2. United States v. Demjanjuk, 518 F. Supp. 1362 (N.D. Ohio 1981).
3. A person whose citizenship is revoked is returned to his country of origin. 1 M.
BAssIouNI, INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION, UNITED STATES LAW AND PRACTICE § 2

(1983). Demjanjuk, a Ukrainian, would have been deported to the Soviet Union.
4. Wall St. J., July 3, 1985, at 14, col. 4.
5. In re Extradition of Demjanjuk, 612 F. Supp. 544 (N.D. Ohio), petitionfor writ of
habeascorpus denied, Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky, 612 F. Supp. 571 (N.D. Ohio), aff'd, 776
F.2d 571 (6th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 106 S. Ct. 1198 (1986).
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Demjanjuk's extradition to Israel has set the stage for what will
probably be the last major trial of an alleged Nazi war criminal in the
West. 6 The 1961 trial of Adolf Eichmann provides the clearest precedent for the Demjanjuk trial.7 Demjanjuk revisits not only issues
posed during the Eichmann trial, but also questions raised by the trial
of the major war criminals before the International Military Tribunal
at Nuremberg (the "Nuremberg trial"). The difficult issues of extralegal capture that threatened to undermine the Eichmann trial, however, do not exist in the Demjanjuk case. Thus, Demjanjuk's trial
turns on the different, albeit equally difficult issues regarding the legal
competence of a state to try a person for crimes committed outside its
territory under legislation passed after the crimes were committed.
This Article first examines the question of Israel's jurisdiction
over Demjanjuk. The Demjanjuk courts dealt with this issue at
length, invoking the Nuremberg and Eichmann trials as precedent.
The courts also relied on an expanded theory of universal jurisdiction,
a theory that recently has become widely-accepted. 8
This Article then considers the applicability of the political
offense exception to extradition. Although the Demjanjuk courts dealt
with it only briefly, this second issue illustrates the conceptual changes
in international law that have taken place in the post-war era as courts
and commentators have struggled to define and protect legitimate
political activity while insuring that those who commit punishable
6. In May 1986, Andrija Artukovic was convicted of killing 700,000 Jews, Serbs,
Gypsies, and Croats in World War II concentration camps in Croatia. Artukovic was
sentenced to death by firing squad. His sentence was upheld by the Yugoslav Federal
Court in September 1986. N.Y. Times, Sept. 3, 1986, at A5, col. 1. In April 1987, Karl
Linnas was deported to the Soviet Union where he had been tried, convicted, and sentenced
to death in absentia in 1962 for his role as the supervisor of an Estonian concentration
camp during World War II. N.Y. Times, Apr. 21, 1987, at A!, col. 1. Linnas, however,
died soon after being deported, on July 2, 1987. N.Y. Times, July 3, 1987, at A2, col. 1.
Feodor Federanko was deported to the Soviet Union in 1984. He was tried and sentenced
to death in June 1986 for treason and participation in mass executions during World War
II. N.Y. Times, June 20, 1986, at A2, col. 5; see also A. RYAN, JR., QUIET NEIGHBORS:
PROSECUTING NAzI WAR CRIMINALS IN AMERICA 142-90 (1984).

7. Adolph Eichmann, as director of the Office for Jewish Affairs and Evacuation
Affairs in the Third Reich, was responsible for coordinating the Final Solution, Hitler's
plan to exterminate all the European Jews. A group of Israelis kidnapped Eichmann in
Argentina in 1960 and brought him to Jerusalem. Eichmann was charged under Israel's
Nazis and Nazi Collaborators (Punishment) Law with, inter alia, crimes against the Jewish
people, crimes against humanity, and war crimes. Nazis and Nazi Collaborators (Punishment) Law 5710, 57 SEFER HAHUKIM 281 (1950) [hereinafter Nazi Statute]; see also
Fawcett, The Eichmann Case, 1962 BRrr. Y.B. INT'L L. 181, 182. Demjanjuk has been
charged with the same offenses. See infra text accompanying notes 51-53.
8. For an excellent introductory discussion of the universality principle, see generally
Feller, JurisdictionOver Offenses With a Foreign Element, in 2 A TREATISE ON INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 5, 32-34 (1973).
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crimes are brought to justice. 9
Finally, an underlying question ties the two issues together: even

if an expanded notion of universality jurisdiction and a restricted
interpretation of the political offense exception in the context of the
extradition of an alleged Nazi war criminal are valid, what ramifications do these reformulated doctrines have for less clear cases of universal crimes?
II. THE CASE HISTORY

A. THE DISPLACED PERSONS ACT
The United States admitted John Demjanjuk for lawful permanent residence on February 9, 1952, pursuant to the Displaced Persons
Act of 1948 (the "DPA"). 10 On November 14, 1958, Demjanjuk
became a U.S. citizen by order of the United States District Court in
Cleveland, Ohio. 1
The Displaced Persons Act, as originally enacted in 1948, pro-

vided for the admission of 202,000 "eligible displaced persons" to the
United States between June 30, 1948 and July 1, 1950.12 "Eligible displaced persons" referred to those displaced persons so designated by
the International Refugee Organization ("IRO") who had entered the

Allied zones of Germany, Austria, or Italy on or after September 1,
1939 and on or before December 22, 1945, and who were there on
January 1, 1948. Forty percent of the visas issued under the Displaced
Persons Act were reserved for displaced persons "whose place of origin or country of nationality [had] been de facto annexed by a foreign
power," and thirty percent of the visas were allocated to farmers.13
Although seemingly innocuous, these limiting provisions significantly skewed the DPA's benefits. The Displaced Persons Act was
9. For a comprehensive introduction to the political offense exception, see generally 2
M. BASSIOUNI, supra note 3, § 2-1.
10. Displaced Persons Act of 1948, ch. 647, 62 Stat. 1009 (1949) (codified as amended
at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1951-1965 (1982)) [hereinafter Displaced Persons Act]. The Displaced
Persons Act was a belated response by the United States to the post-war refugee problem.
The product of a Congress unwilling to forego quotas or repudiate widespread restrictionist
sentiment, the Displaced Persons Act was the culmination of a three year battle to force the
United States to take an active role in the resettlement of displaced persons.
11. See United States v. Demjanjuk, 518 F. Supp. 1362, 1363 (N.D. Ohio 1981).
12. The Displaced Persons Act was enacted in order to help relieve the problem of
homeless and stateless persons in Europe. Although seven million people were repatriated
in the three years following the war, one million "hard-core" displaced persons remained in
camps in the occupation zones. Id. at 1378.
13. Displaced Persons Act, supra note 10, § 2(b). The Displaced Persons Act was
amended in 1950 to provide for a total of 301,500 displaced persons to be admitted through
the end of the program in 1952. The amended version of the Displaced Persons Act eliminated the agricultural preference and the preference provisions for persons from "annexed"
territories. Act of June 16, 1950, ch. 262, 64 Stat. 219 (1950); see also L. DINNERSTEIN,
AMERICA AND THE SURVIVORS OF THE HOLOCAUST 249 (1982).
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criticized as being "viciously discriminatory."' 1 4 President Truman
called for immediate remedial action to change provisions that he
believed could have been inserted only "on the abhorrent ground of
15
intolerance."
Even more disturbing than the criticism that the DPA was unfair,
however, was the charge that it enabled Nazi sympathizers and collab-

orators to resettle in the United States. Critics noted that many of the
eligible Balts and Ukrainians were "especially egregious collaborators" who had "guided the SS men, searched the ghettos, beat the people, assembled and drove them to the places of slaughter, [and served
16
as] guards and tormentors within the concentration camps."
Although U.S. officials knew of the presence of collaborators in the
displaced persons camps, they did little to eliminate these people
through the displaced persons screening process.17
In the twenty-five years following the war, the Immigration and
Naturalization Service (the "INS"), the agency responsible for enforcing U.S. immigration laws, did not vigorously pursue the alleged war
18
criminals who were "laundered" through the Displaced Persons Act.
Instead, the INS quickly plunged into Cold War politics, becoming
preoccupied with its efforts to denaturalize and deport alleged Com-

munists. During this time, the INS filed no more than ten cases
against suspected Nazi collaborators. The filed cases appear to have
been randomly selected and were prosecuted with little zeal or
14. 94 CONG. REc. H8860 (1948) (statement of Rep. Multer during the debate on H.R.
REP. No. 647, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. (1948), the report accompanying the House bill to
amend the Immigration Act, H.R. 3566, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. (1948)). The early cutoff
date excluded at least 100,000 Jews who had returned to Poland after the war, only to flee
the pogroms that erupted in 1946. L. DINNERSTEIN, supra note 13, at 166. The preference
provisions for farmers and persons from "de facto annexed territories," interpreted by the
State Department to include the Baltic States and other territories under Soviet control,
allotted a disproportionate number of visas to Estonians, Latvians, Lithuanians, and
Ukrainians.
15. Statement of President Truman on the Signing of the Displaced Persons Act of
1948, 19 DEP'T ST. BULL. 21-22 (1948).
16. L. DINNERSTEIN, supra note 13, at 177 (quoting Abraham Duker, who had worked
for the Nuremberg Trials Commission). Eastern European collaborators fled to the displaced persons camps in the Allied occupation zones, fearing they would be killed by the
Russians as traitors if they stayed in Soviet-occupied territory. Former Congresswoman
Elizabeth Holtzman estimates that as many as 10,000 war criminals gained admission to
the United States after the war. Holtzman maintains that among them were concentration
camp guards, men who served with the police units in Eastern Europe, and mayors of
towns who herded Jews into ghettos and confiscated their property. Address by former
U.S. Representative Elizabeth Holtzman, Harvard University (Oct. 25, 1985) [hereinafter
Holtzman Address].
17. L. DINNERSTEIN, supra note 13, at 197-98. A 1949 American army intelligence
report confirmed that "hundreds, if not thousands, of Nazi collaborators have been and still
are residing in displaced person camps." Id. at 197.
18. A. RYAN, JR., supra note 6, at 31.
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success. 19

In the 1970s, the INS finally began systematically to investigate
the alleged war criminals who had so easily entered the country three
decades earlier. 20 According to many, however, the INS efforts were
too little and too late. Disgusted by her perception of INS incompetence, however, Congresswoman Elizabeth Holtzman used her power
as chairwoman of the House Judiciary Committee's Immigration Subcommittee to force the U.S. Justice Department to assume responsibility for the Nazi cases. On March 28, 1979, the Justice Department
formed the Office of Special Investigations ("OSI") within its Criminal
Division, 2 1 to act "unequivocally and vigorously to deny sanctuary in
the United States to persons who committed the worst crime in the
'22
history of humanity.
B.

DEMJANJUK'S DENATURALIZATION PROCEEDING

John Demjanjuk became one of dozens of alleged Nazi war

criminals whom the OSI sought to denaturalize and deport. 23 In
1977, twenty-five years after his admission to the United States, the

U.S. government brought suit against Demjanjuk, charging him with
illegal procurement of his citizenship. Specifically, the government
charged that Demjanjuk, a Ukrainian who had fought in the Russian
army, served in the German Schutzstaffel (the "SS") at the SS training
camp at Trawniki, Poland, and at the Treblinka and Sobibor death
19. Id. at 31-42.
20. It took the efforts of Congresswoman Elizabeth Holtzman and Congressman
Joshua Eilberg to initiate action by the White House and the State Department. Holtzman
and Eilberg urged the Ford Administration to seek the cooperation of Germany, Israel, and
the Soviet Union in the search for suspected Nazi war criminals in the United States, and
regularly criticized the State Department for what they considered unjustified delay. By
the summer of 1977, the INS had dissolved the special task force it had set up four years
earlier and transferred all responsibility for the Nazi cases to a special litigation unit within
the Service. That unit, however, proved a disastrous attempt to consolidate INS expertise
on the Nazi cases. From 1977 to 1979 the unit did not file a single new case and performed
poorly on the cases it attempted to litigate. Id. at 59-60.
21. Id. at 62.
22. Id. at 61 (quoting Congresswoman Holtzman); see also Holtzman Address, supra
note 16. The Office of Special Investigations currently operates with an annual budget of
approximately $3 million and a staff of 20 lawyers, 10 historians, and numerous investigators. Address given by Allan A. Ryan, Jr., Prof. Philip Heymann's Law Enforcement Seminar, Harvard Law School (Nov. 14, 1985) [hereinafter Ryan Address].
23. The OSI initiates thorough trials attempting to prove that the defendants procured
their visas, and hence their citizenship, illegally. At these denaturalization trials, the government seeks to prove the defendants' non-compliance with the immigration laws based
on their participation in atrocities and brutal persecutions. Ryan Address, supra note 22.
Allan A. Ryan, Jr., former head of OSI, estimates that 75 percent of each trial consists of
testimony describing what occurred in the concentration camps or the terrorized villages
and towns. Id. Only after such evidence is introduced does the government address the
legal questions of ineligibility under the immigration laws. Id.
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camps. 24 The government also charged that Demjanjuk served in a
German military unit toward the end of the war.25 The government
claimed that Demjanjuk's activities during the war excluded him from
the DPA's definition of an "eligible displaced person."' 26 The government also maintained that Demjanjuk's visa was invalid because he
27
had willfully misrepresented his war-time activities.
The Demjanjuk case went to trial in February, 1981, presided
over by Chief Judge Battisti of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Ohio. 2 8 At trial, the court found that Demjanjuk had
been taken prisoner by the Germans in 1942. Following a brief incarceration in German prisoner of war camps, Demjanjuk was transferred to an SS training camp at Trawniki. There, like other Russian
prisoners of war, Demjanjuk took an oath of service to the German SS
and was recruited to work in Action Reinhard, the SS program to
exterminate the Jews of the Nazi-occupied countries. In the fall of
1942, Demjanjuk was sent to work at the extermination camp at Treblinka. Known as "Ivan Grozny" or "Ivan the Terrible," Demjanjuk
operated the camp's gas chambers and participated in the beating and
29
torturing of the camp inmates.
Demjanjuk concealed this information when he applied to the
International Refugee Organization for assistance in 1948, when he
applied to the Displaced Persons Commission for consideration to
immigrate to the United States, and when he applied for an immigration visa. At those times, he claimed to have been a farmer in Poland
until 1943 and then to have worked in Danzig and Munich until the
end of the war. 30 At trial, Demjanjuk admitted to making these misrepresentations, claiming he did so in order to avoid repatriation to the
31
Soviet Union.
The district court held that Demjanjuk's failure to disclose his
service at Trawniki and Treblinka constituted a material misrepresentation under sections 2(b) and 10 of the DPA and found the Supreme
Court's decision in Fedorenko v. United States 32 dispositive of whether
33
Demjanjuk illegally procured his visa and his citizenship.
24. United States v. Demjanjuk, 518 F. Supp. 1362, 1363 (N.D. Ohio 1981).

25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. The government had filed suit in the United States District Court for the Southern
District of Ohio pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1451(a) (1982), which requires that suit be fied in
the district in which the defendant resides.
29. United States v. Demjanjuk, 518 F. Supp. 1362, 1363-71 (N.D. Ohio 1981).
30. Id. at 1379.
31. Id. at 1379-80.
32. 449 U.S. 490 (1981) (Fedorenko was charged with concealing his service as an
armed guard at Treblinka).
33. Id. at 1380-81.
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In Fedorenko, the Supreme Court determined that section 2(b) of
the DPA incorporated the definitions of refugees and displaced persons contained in the IRO Constitution's definition of "eligible displaced persons."'3 4 Annex I of the IRO Constitution specifically
excluded from this category any person who assisted "the enemy in
persecuting civil populations" or who "voluntarily assisted the enemy
forces... in their operations. ' 35 Section 10 of the DPA further provided that any person who made willful misrepresentations for the
purpose of gaining admission into the United States as an eligible dis36
placed person would not be admitted.
The Supreme Court interpreted section 10 to apply to willful misrepresentations of material facts and noted that "at the very least, a
misrepresentation must be considered material if disclosure of the true
facts would have made the applicant ineligible for a visa." 37 The
Court concluded that if Fedorenko had disclosed his service as an
armed guard at Treblinka, he would have been ineligible for a visa
under the Displaced Persons Act.
Relying on Fedorenko, the district court in Demjanjuk found
Demjanjuk similarly ineligible for a visa under the DPA. Based on its
findings that Demjanjuk had served at Trawniki and Treblinka, the
court concluded that Demjanjuk was not an "eligible displaced person" under section 2(b) of the DPA and had, therefore, procured his
visa illegally.3 8 Consequently, Demjanjuk failed to satisfy a statutory
prerequisite of naturalization-lawful admission to the United States.
39
This rendered his citizenship revocable as being illegally procured.
Alternatively, the district court held that Demjanjuk's certificate
of naturalization was cancellable under 8 U.S.C. § 1451(a) because it
was procured by "concealment of a material fact or by willful misrepresentation." 4 The court referred to the materiality test set forth in
Chaunt v. United States.4 1 In Chaunt, the Supreme Court stated that
to prove misrepresentation or concealment of a material fact, the government had to show either 1) the suppression of facts which, if
34. Id at 495 n.3; Displaced Persons Act, supra note 10, § 2(b).
35. Fedorenko, 449 U.S. at 495 n.3.
36. Id. at 495.
37. Id. at 509 (emphasis added).
38. United States v. Demjanjuk, 518 F. Supp. 1362, 1381-82 (N.D. Ohio 1981).
39. Id. at 1380, 1382. The court noted that Demjanjuk was also ineligible for a visa
pursuant to section 13 of the Displaced Persons Act, as amended in 1950. Section 13
provided that no visas were to be issued to "any person who advocated or assisted in the
persecution of any person because of race, religion or national origin, or to any person who
has voluntarily borne arms against the United States during World War II." Id. at 1382
n.43.
40. Id. at 1382-83.
41. 364 U.S. 350 (1960) (providing standards of proof of misrepresentation in a denaturalization proceeding).
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known, would have warranted denial of citizenship, or 2) that the disclosure of suppressed facts might have been useful in an investigation
that could have led to the discovery of other facts warranting denial of
citizenship.4 2 The Demjanjuk court found that Demjanjuk had denied
giving false testimony on his citizenship application for the purpose of
obtaining benefits under the immigration and nationality laws. 43 This
denial precluded any inquiry into Demjanjuk's wartime activities.

Had those activities been known, Demjanjuk's petition for naturalization would have been denied. 44
The district court concluded that the government had satisfied its
heavy burden of proof. To meet this burden, the government had to
introduce "clear, unequivocal and convincing" evidence, a standard

the Supreme Court first enunciated in cases involving denaturalization
proceedings brought against alleged Communists, and subsequently

affirmed in Fedorenko.45 Although this high standard exists to protect
defendants about to lose their "precious" right of U.S. citizenship, the
district court determined that Demjanjuk's illegally procured certifi46
cate of naturalization had to be cancelled.

Within eighteen months, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district
court's decision denaturalizing Demjanjuk, 4 7 and the Supreme Court
denied Demjanjuk's petition for certiorari. 4 8 Shortly thereafter, the

government instituted deportation proceedings based on Deijanjuk's
illegal presence in the country.49 While the deportation proceeding
50

was before the immigration court, Israel filed an extradition request.

42. Id at 355.
43. Demjanjuk, 518 F. Supp. at 1383.
44. Id. The court arguably misapplied the Chaunt test in reaching this alternative
holding. The Chaunt test applies only when a court is determining the materiality of misrepresentations and omissions made on a citizenship application, assuming that the applicant has been lawfully admitted to the United States. Given its finding that Demjanjuk's
initial entry was unlawful, the Demjanjuk court had no grounds to reach the Chaunt question. See Note, Denaturalizationof Nazi War CriminalsAfter FEDORENKO, 15 N.Y.U. J.
INT'L L. & POL. 169, 178, 191-92 (1982).
45. See, eg., Fedorenko v. United States, 449 U.S. 490, 505 (1981); Schneiderman v.
United States, 320 U.S. 118, 135 (1943).
46. Demjanjuk, 518 F. Supp. at 1386. The Supreme Court has repeatedly characterized the right to acquire U.S. citizenship as "precious." See Fedorenko, 449 U.S. at 505,
and cases cited therein.
47. United States v. Demjanjuk, 680 F.2d 32 (6th Cir. 1982).
48. Demjanjuk v. United States, 459 U.S. 1036 (1982).
49. The INS began deportation proceedings against Demjanjuk on December 6, 1982.
The Immigration Court ordered Demjanjuk deported to the Soviet Union on May 23, 1984.
That decision was subsequently affirmed by the Board of Immigration Appeals, In re
Demjanjuk, I. & N. Dec. File A8-237-417 (Cleveland) (B.I.A. February 14, 1985), and by
the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, United States v. Demjanjuk, 767 F.2d 922 (6th Cir.)
(citation limited by Sixth Circuit Rule 24; see LEXIS, Genfed library, Usapp file), cert
denied - U.S. _ 106 S.Ct. 597 (1985).
50. In re Extradition of Demjanjuk, 603 F. Supp. 1463 (N.D. Ohio 1984). On October
31, 1983, the Israeli government requested Demjanjuk's extradition pursuant to an Israeli
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The request charged Demjanjuk with murder, manslaughter, and

malicious wounding under the terms of the United States-Israel Extradition Treaty.5 1 Invoking the 1950 Nazis and Nazi Collaborators
(Punishment) Law (the "Nazi Statute"),5 2 Israel detailed the offenses
allegedly committed by Demjanjuk as follows:
The suspect, nicknamed "Ivan the Terrible", was a member of the S.S., and in
the years 1942-43 operated the gas chambers to exterminate prisoners at the
Treblinka death camp in the Lublin area of Poland, which was occupied by the
Nazis during the Second World War. The suspect murdered tens of thousands
of Jews, as well as non-Jews, killing them, injuring them, causing them serious
bodily and mental harm and subjected them to living conditions calculated to
bring about their physical destruction. The suspect committed these acts with
the intention
of destroying the Jewish people and to commit crimes against
53
humanity.

Pursuant to its obligations under the United States-Israel Extradition
Treaty, the United States filed a complaint in federal district court
54
seeking Demjanjuk's extradition to Israel.
III.

THE EXTRADITION CASE

The right of any foreign country to request the return of a fugitive
from the United States, and the obligation of the United States to surrender the fugitive, depend on the existence of an extradition treaty

between the United States and the requesting nation.55 Pursuant to 18
U.S.C. §§ 3183 and 3184, the United States may surrender an accused

person to a requesting state only if a valid extradition treaty exists
with the requesting state. 56 The language of sections 3183 and 3184

does not indicate whether satisfaction of the statutory requirements
imposes an obligation on the United States to extradite; however, U.S.
jurisprudence reflects the view that extradition is always subject to
57
executive discretion.
arrest warrant issued on October 18, 1983. The U.S. government filed a complaint seeking
extradition of Demjanjuk to Israel on November 18, 1983. In re Extradition of Demjanjuk,
612 F. Supp. 544 (N.D. Ohio 1985).
51. Convention on Extradition, Dec. 10, 1962, United States-Israel, 14 U.S.T. 1717,
T.I.A.S. No. 5476 [hereinafter Extradition Treaty]. The request was the first ever filed by
Israel to extradite a Nazi war criminal from the United States.
52. See supra note 7.
53. In re Extradition of Demjanjuk, 603 F. Supp. at 1467.
54. In re Extradition of Demjanjuk, 584 F. Supp. 1321, 1323 (N.D. Ohio 1984). The
district court later ruled that the extradition and deportation proceedings were independent
and could proceed simultaneously. Furthermore, the government was not obligated to
elect either deportation or extradition as the sole means of proceeding against Demjanjuk.
In re Extradition of Demjanjuk, 612 F. Supp. at 547.
55. Factor v. Laubenheimer, 290 U.S. 276, 287 (1933).
56. 1 M. BAssIoum, supra note 3, at ch. 2, § 5-1.
57. Id Professor Bassiouni adds that this view may not be in accord with international
law. Id
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The purpose of an extradition hearing is to determine whether
sufficient evidence exists to sustain the charge against the accused
under the provisions of the applicable treaty.5 8 To find "sufficient evidence," a judge must determine that "there is 'probable cause' or 'reasonable grounds' to believe the individual is guilty of the crime

charged."' 59 If a judge finds sufficient evidence to sustain the charges
under the applicable treaty, the judge certifies the same to the Secretary of State, who can then issue a warrant of surrender to the "proper
60
authorities" of the requesting state.
No direct appeal may be taken from the issuance of an extradition

certificate. 61 The accused may petition for a writ of habeas corpus, but
review on habeas is limited. 62 For an extradition determination to survive collateral review under habeas corpus, the following conditions

must be met:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

The judge must be authorized to conduct extradition proceedings.
The judge must have jurisdiction of the subject matter and of the accused.
The applicable treaties must be in fill force and effect.
The crimes for which extradition is requested must be offenses "within the
treaty".
The judge must determine that the party brought before it is the one
named in the complaint ....
63
There must be "competent and adequate evidence" for the decision.

The district court had no difficulty resolving the first condition.
As a federal judge, Battisti was empowered to conduct the extradition
proceedings pursuant to the explicit terms of 18 U.S.C. § 3184.64 As

to the third condition, a valid extradition treaty is in force between the
United States and Israel.6 5 The court, however, had more difficulty
resolving the sixth condition, the existence of "competent and adequate" evidence. Under the applicable statutes and case law, the

requesting state may either present witnesses or rely on properly
authenticated depositions, warrants, and other documents for its
proof.66 The respondent may present witnesses, but not documents on
58. 18 U.S.C. § 3184 (1982).
59. In re Extradition of Demjanjuk, 603 F. Supp. 1463, 1464 (N.D. Ohio 1984). Under
18 U.S.C. § 3184, either a judge or a magistrate may preside over an extradition hearing.
The discussion here is cast in terms of a judge for convenience only.
60. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3184, 3186 (1982).
61. Collins v. Miller, 252 U.S. 364 (1920) (cited with approval in Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky, 776 F.2d 571, 576 (6th Cir. 1985)).
62. In re Mackin, 668 F.2d 122 (2d Cir. 1981).
63. In re Extradition of Demjanjuk, 603 F. Supp. at 1464.
64. 18 U.S.C. § 3184 (1982). Judge Battisti presided over the extradition proceeding in
accordance with the assignment procedures of the Northern District of Ohio, which provided that cases involving the same parties and the same events be assigned to one judge.
In re Extradition of Demjanjuk, 584 F. Supp. 1321, 1324 (N.D. Ohio 1984).
65. See supra note 51.
66. See Bingham v. Bradley, 241 U.S. 511 (1916).
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his behalf.67 The court interpreted the "competent and adequate"
standard to mean that the respondent could not present evidence contradicting the requesting state's proof, rather, the respondent could
only present "explanatory" evidence. 68 Thus, while Demjanjuk could
present evidence rebutting probable cause, he could not present evidence in defense, such as alibi. 69 The court reserved discretion to
70
decide what constituted permissible "explanatory" evidence.
The district court could not so easily dispose of the three remaining conditions. The ultimate resolution of these issues formed the core
of the district court's extradition decision. This Article, therefore,
now considers the issues of identification (condition five), subject matter jurisdiction (condition two), and then focuses on two facets of the
treaty interpretation question (condition four), Israel's jurisdiction to
try Demjanjuk and the applicability of the political offense exception.
A.

IDENTIFICATION

The identification of Demjanjuk as the person named in the complaint became a contested issue due to Demjanjuk's repeated denials
that he was "Ivan the Terrible" of Treblinka.7 1 Despite Demjanjuk's
insistence that he was not the man Israel sought, the district court
'72
found probable cause to believe Demjanjuk was "Ivan the Terrible.
Identification had been a key issue in Demjanjuk's denaturalization case, as it is in virtually all cases brought against alleged war
criminals. In the denaturalization case, the government introduced
what became known as the "Trawniki card," a picture identification
card which stated: "Iwan Demjanjuk is employed as a guard in the
Guard Units (Wachmannschaften) of the Reich Leader of the SS for
the Establishment of SS and Police Headquarters in the New Eastern
Territory. '73 Concluding that the card was authentic despite
Demjanjuk's insistence to the contrary, the court found the Trawniki
card clearly established Demjanjuk's presence at the SS training
67. In re Extradition of Demjanjuk, 603 F. Supp. at 1465 (§ 3190 provisions regarding
documentary evidence unavailable to respondent) (citing Oteiza v. Jacobus, 136 U.S. 330
(1890); see also 18 U.S.C. §§ 3190-91 (1982).
68. In re Extradition of Demjanjuk, 603 F. Supp. at 1464.
69. Id. This evidence would obviously be admissible at any subsequent full-scale trial.
See id. at 1465.
70. Id. at 1465.
71. In re Extradition of Demjanjuk, 612 F. Supp. 544, 547 (N.D. Ohio 1985) (extradition case); United States v. Demjanjuk, 518 F. Supp. 1362, 1376 (N.D. Ohio 1985) (denaturalization case). Demjanjuk continued to deny that he was the person sought by Israel at
his arraignment before the district court in Jerusalem. N.Y. Times, Mar. 3, 1986, at A3,
col. 4, and again at trial, N.Y. Times, Nov. 27, 1985, at A5, col. 1.
72. In re Extradition of Demjanjuk, 612 F. Supp. at 547.
73. Demjanjuk, 518 F. Supp. at 1366.
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camp. 74 Furthermore, the court determined that Demjanjuk had been
at Treblinka based on photographic identifications made by six camp
survivors.

75

The extradition court noted that the government had only to
make out a prima facie case to establish identification. 76 While the
government did not have to prove that the person demanded was the
person before the court, it did have to show probable cause to believe
the two were the same. 77 Moreover, the court held that it could rely
78
solely on affidavits to identify the individual sought for extradition.
Although Demjanjuk's identity had been established in the denaturalization proceeding and the denaturalization findings had been incorporated into Israel's extradition request, the government stated that

independent eyewitness identifications could sufficiently identify
Demjanjuk as the individual sought by Israel. 79 Because the court held
affidavit identification to be sufficient, the government did not have to
rely on the Trawniki card, thereby precluding Demjanjuk from chal80
lenging the card's authenticity a second time.

Having set this rather low threshold standard for identification,
the court easily found that the government had met its burden of
showing probable cause. In particular, the court relied on photographs and eyewitness affidavits given by six Treblinka survivors.8 1
The court found that positive identification was established irrespective of the Trawniki card. 82 The court concluded its discussion of the
identification issue by noting the "obvious and striking resemblance"
83
between the man in the photographs and Demjanjuk.
74. Id. at 1368. Although DemJanjuk maintained that the card was forged by the
Soviet authorities, the district court rejected Demjanjuk's contentions that the Soviets had
improperly tampered with documents and witnesses. United States v. Demjanjuk, 103
F.R.D. 1, 5 (N.D. Ohio 1983). The court compared Demjanjuk's case with the case of
United States v. Kungys, 571 F. Supp. 1104 (D.N.J. 1983), where the court had found such
improper behavior and held much of the government's evidence inadmissible. As a result,
the court in Kungys found that the government had not sustained its heavy burden of proof.
The Third Circuit, however, reversed the lower court's decision in Kungys, finding sufficient evidence in the record to resolve the denaturalization issue even excluding Soviet
depositions which the government had tried to introduce. United States v. Kungys, 793
F.2d 516, 520 (3rd Cir.), cert granted, - U.S. -, 107 S.Ct. 431 (1986).
75. Demjanjuk, 518 F. Supp. at 1376.
76. In re Extradition of Demjanjuk, 612 F. Supp. at 548, 552.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 550.
79. Id.
80. In re Extradition of Demjanjuk, 603 F. Supp. 1468, 1471-72 (N.D. Ohio 1985).
81. In re Extradition of Demjanjuk, 612 F. Supp. at 550-52. It is estimated that only
20 survivors of the Treblinka camp are still alive. Boston Globe, Mar. 3, 1986, at 3, col. 1.
82. See supra notes 78-80 and accompanying text; see also DemJanjuk v. Petrovsky, 776
F.2d 571, 577 (6th Cir. 1985) cert. denied, - U.S. -, 106 S.Ct. 1198 (1986).
83. The court seemed so certain that Demjanjuk was "Ivan the Terrible" that the eyewitness identifications seem merely to confirm its own identification. In re Extradition of
Demjanjuk, 612 F. Supp. at 554. The court's certainty is hardly surprising given its earlier

294

CORNELL INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

[V/ol. 20:281

The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's
findings on the identification issue.8 4 Reiterating the limited nature of
an extradition proceeding, the court noted that it was irrelevant that
Demjanjuk had "had no opportunity to cross-examine the afflants." 's5
The court emphasized that an extradition court's sole evidentiary
function "is to determine whether there is sufficient evidence to justify
'8 6
holding a person for trial in another place."
The court rejected a third challenge by Demjanjuk as to the
Trawniki card's authenticity. First, the court found, based on the district court's conclusions, that no support existed for Demjanjuk's
claim that the card was forged and that the government had perpetrated a fraud on the court by introducing it into evidence.8 7 Second,
the court held that because the district court had not relied on the card
to identify Demjanjuk, the issue of the card's validity was not properly
8
before the court on appeal.1
The Sixth Circuit acknowledged the lenient standard for evaluating identification evidence in an extradition proceeding, and found
that the government had met its burden of producing "any evidence
warranting the finding that there was reasonable ground to believe
[Demjanjuk] guilty of the crimes charged."'8 9 Thus, the Sixth Circuit
seemed to agree with the district court's conclusion that the trial in
Israel represented the appropriate forum for Demjanjuk to introduce
exculpatory evidence. 90
B.

SUBJECT MAT=ER JURISDICTION

Notwithstanding the statutory grant of jurisdiction to federal
courts to preside over extradition proceedings, Demjanjuk argued that
the district court lacked jurisdiction over the subject matter of the
extradition. That is, Demjanjuk contended that the district court
could not conduct the extradition proceeding without specific authorization to hear war crimes cases. 9 1 Demjanjuk claimed that because he
had been a soldier and a prisoner of war, and because the crimes
alleged occurred during wartime, only a military tribunal could try
findings on identification in the denaturalization case. See United States v. Denijanjuk, 518
F. Supp. 1362 (N.D. Ohio 1981); see also supra notes 73-81 and accompanying text.
84. Denijanjuk v. Petrovsky, 776 F. 2d at 576.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 577.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 576 (quoting Justice Holmes in Fernandez v. Phillips, 268 U.S. 311, 312
(1925)).
90. In re Extradition of Demjanjuk, 612 F. Supp. 544, 552 (N.D. Ohio 1985).
91. In re Extradition of Denijanjuk, 603 F. Supp. 1468, 1473-74 (N.D. Ohio 1984).
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him. 92 Accordingly, Demjanjuk contended that only a military tribu93
nal would have jurisdiction to extradite him.
The district court rejected Demjanjuk's argument on two levels.
First, the court reviewed the case law and found no case in which a
federal (civilian) court determined that it lacked jurisdiction over an
extradition proceeding because the subject matter involved war
crimes. 94 The court further determined that neither the Constitution
nor the statutes give military tribunals exclusive jurisdiction over war
crimes. 95 The court found "no reason why jurisdiction to try John
Demjanjuk should be vested exclusively in an American military tribunal."'9 6 Noting that no U.S. military tribunal currently exists to try
alleged war criminals, the court decided that "Congress certainly did
not intend for persons physically present in the United States who are
accused of 'war crimes' to be able to avoid trial and punishment
because no American court had jurisdiction to hear an extradition
request."' 97 The court noted that its refusal to shield Demjanjuk from
prosecution was consistent with the U.S. policy of trying and punishing war criminals, as reflected by "this nation's participation in the
''
Nuremberg trials. 98
Despite the lack of clear Congressional intent, the district court
probably reached the correct result regarding its jurisdiction to conduct the extradition proceeding. The plain language of the statutory
authorization for the proceeding does not restrict the categories of
charges that a federal (civilian) court may consider. 99 Furthermore,
consistent with the court's finding that an extradition proceeding is
akin to a preliminary hearing and not to a full-fledged trial,
Demjanjuk's contention that servicemen have never been tried by civilian courts in the United States was irrelevant.
The district court also discussed the issue of subject matter jurisdiction in terms of Demjanjuk's being charged with "war crimes." 10 0
The court had previously noted that it did "not today find [that] the
92. Id. at 1474.
93. Id. at 1476.
94. Id. at 1474. The court specifically noted the extradition cases of alleged war
criminals Hermione Braunsteiner Ryan and Andrija Artukovic. In neither case did the
respondent challenge the extradition court's subject matter jurisdiction. The court apparently decided this meant there was no merit to Demjanjuk's claim, or else Ryan and
Artukovic would surely have raised a similar challenge. Id. at 1474-75.
95. Id. at 1475.
96. Id. at 1476.
97. Id. The court did not rule out the possibility that an American military tribunal
could be constituted to try alleged war criminals. It simply emphasized that none exists at
this time. Allan A. Ryan, Jr. believes that it is highly unlikely that Congress would act to
constitute such a tribunal today. Ryan Address, supra note 22.
98. In re Extradition of Demjanjuk, 603 F. Supp. at 1476.
99. See 18 U.S.C. § 3184 (1982).
100. In re Extradition of Demjanjuk, 603 F. Supp. at 1477-79.
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alleged conduct respondent is accused of constitutes war crimes or
genocide... [but rather that] the United States government on behalf
of the State of Israel has formally charged respondent with murder,
manslaughter, and malicious wounding."' 0 1 Presumably, Demjanjuk
could not object to the court's subject matter jurisdiction if those were
indeed the charges.
The court's ultimate conclusion that the charges against
Demjanjuk fell within the extradition treaty between the United States
and Israel depended on the characterization of his alleged crimes as
murder. 102 Because Article II of the treaty recognizes murder as an
extraditable crime, the murder charges against Demjanjuk clearly fell
03
within the terms of the treaty.1
Two of Demjanjuk's other defenses to extradition also failed
based on the characterization of his alleged crimes as murder. The
court rejected Demjanjuk's time bar defense, because neither the
United States nor the State of Ohio imposes a statute of limitation on

murder charges.'04 Demjanjuk also claimed that the possibility of his
receiving the death penalty if convicted under the Nazi Statute should

bar his extradition.

05

In rejecting this claim, the court noted that

both the United States and Ohio impose the death penalty "for murder
10 6
of the type and magnitude alleged."'
IV.

TREATY INTERPRETATION: ISRAELI JURISDICTION
TO TRY DEMJANJUK

The most complex issues of the case concerned treaty interpretation. After laying out the relevant questions in a preliminary order,

Chief Judge Battisti discussed them at length in his extradition
07

opinion. 1

101. Id. at 1474 n.2. Article II of the U.S.-Israel Extradition Treaty specifically provides for extradition in cases where the accused is charged with those crimes. Extradition
Treaty, supra note 51, art. II.
102. The court refused to extradite Demjanjuk on the charges of manslaughter and
malicious wounding because the statutes of limitation on those charges had expired. In re
Extradition of Demjanjuk, 612 F. Supp. 544, 561 (N.D. Ohio 1985).
103. Id. The court held that it was immaterial that Demjanjuk would not be prosecuted
for murder in the United States as long as the crime charged fell within the treaty. Id. at
569.
104. Id. at 560.
105. Id. at 566 n.19. Article VII of the U.S.-Israel Extradition Treaty provides that
extradition may be refused if the offense is punishable by death under the laws of the
requesting state, but not under the laws of the requested state. Demjanjuk claimed the
offense charged (war crimes) was punishable by death in Israel, but not in the United
States. Extradition Treaty, supra note 51, art. VII.
106. In re Extradition of Demjanjuk, 612 F. Supp. at 566 n.19.
107. The Chief Judge's characterization of the relevant issues in determining whether
the crimes alleged fell within the treaty was as follows:
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The court concluded that it had the authority to extradite
Demjanjuk under the treaty even though Israel was charging him with
extraterritorial crimes.' 0 8 Since the crimes were extraterritorial in
nature, the court's authority to extradite was discretionary. 0 9 None
of the exceptions to extradition set forth in the treaty applied in this
case: Demjanjuk's alleged crimes were not political offenses; 110 there
was no statute of limitations problem;"' the double jeopardy provision
of the treaty was inapplicable; 1 2 and the Israeli death penalty provisions did not bar extradition." 3 Furthermore, Israel's lack of state114
hood at the time of Demjanjuk's alleged crimes was immaterial.
1. Does this Court have the authority, under the Extradition Treaty to extradite
respondent to Israel where the Israeli government has charged him with crimes
committed outside the territory of the State of Israel (Le., the "extraterritoriality"
of the Extradition Treaty)?
a. Is the judicial determination of whether respondent is extraditable for the
offenses charged discretionary under Article III of the Treaty because the Israeli
statute under which respondent is charged asserts jurisdiction over acts which
occurred outside the territory of Israel?
b. Do the laws of the United States, the requested party, provide for the punishment of similar offenses, within the meaning of Article III of the Treaty?
2. Does the extradition request fall into one of the exceptions to extradition set
forth in the Treaty?
a. Is the Article VI § 1 "double jeopardy" provision applicable to the instant
case?
b. Is the extradition request time-barred under Article VI § 3?
c. Is extradition prohibited by Article VI § 4 because respondent is charged
with crimes allegedly of a "political character"?
d. Do the death penalty provisions of the Nazi and Nazi Collaborators Law
5710-1950 bar extradition?
3. What effect, if any, does Israel's lack of statehood during the time the alleged
crimes occurred have on whether the respondent is extraditable under the Treaty?
4. Is the Nazi and Nazi Collaborators Law an ex post facto law? If so, of what
import is such a determination in these extradition proceedings?
In re Extradition of Demjanjuk, 603 F. Supp. 1468, 1470-71 (N.D. Ohio 1985).
108. In re Extradition of Demjanjuk, 612 F. Supp. at 555.
109. Id. at 561. Article III of the Treaty provides: "When the offense has been committed outside the territorial jurisdiction of the requesting Party, extradition need not be
granted unless the laws of the requested Party provide for the punishment of such an
offense committed in similar circumstances." Extradition Treaty, supra note 51, art. III.
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals interpreted substantially similar language in the
United States-Sweden Extradition Treaty to mean that extradition is discretionary if the
offense is prosecutable under the laws of only one of the countries but mandatory if
prosecutable under the laws of both countries. In re Assarsson, 635 F.2d 1237, 1244-45
(7th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 938 (1981). The Eighth Circuit accepted the Seventh
Circuit's interpretation of the treaty language in a related case involving a different party.
In re Extradition of Assarsson, 687 F.2d 1157, 1163 (8th Cir. 1982). Chief Judge Battisti
cited the,4ssarsson cases as authority, noting that the United States Senate gave its advice
and consent to the United States-Sweden Treaty on the same day it considered the United
States-Israel Treaty. In re Extradition of Demjanjuk, 612 F. Supp. at 561.
110. In re Extradition of Demjanjuk, 612 F. Supp. at 570-71.
Ill. Id. at 560-61. See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
112. Id at 569.
113. Id. at 566 n.19. See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
114. Id. at 568.
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Finally, the court held that the Nazi Statute was not an ex post facto
law.115
The extradition court and the court of appeals on habeas review
made several other findings in discussing the issue of Israel's jurisdiction to try Demjanjuk. 1" 6 Both courts found the universality principle' 7 to be an accepted means of obtaining jurisdiction in
international law, and that the United States specifically incorporated
the principle into section 404 of the Restatement of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States. 1 8 In addition, the district court found
that the political offense exception applied only to political activities
undertaken against established governments or occupying forces, not
to criminal activities intended to solidify the power of an established
government or occupying force. 119 Demjanjuk, therefore, could not
invoke the political offense exception based on his alleged activities in
support of the Nazi occupying forces in Poland. 20 The dismissal of
the political offense exception by the district court as inapplicable to
Demjanjuk's case confirmed the exclusion of crimes against humanity
from the category of protected offenses.
The issue of Israel's jurisdiction over Demjanjuk represented the
most controversial aspect of the case. If Israel lacked jurisdiction, the
United States could not extradite. 12' In concluding that Israel held
jurisdiction, the court advanced two propositions: first, that Israeli
courts have jurisdiction to try alleged war criminals for extraterritorial
crimes pursuant to Israel's Nazi Statute, as interpreted and affirmed
by the Eichmann courts; 22 and second, that international law generally does not prohibit the application of a state's laws or the jurisdiction of its courts over non-citizens for acts committed outside of its
territory.123 Israel, therefore, was not prohibited from asserting jurisdiction under international law, and was affirmatively empowered to
124
do so according to the universality principle of jurisdiction.
115. Id. at 567; see infra notes 128-32 and accompanying text.
116. In re Extradition of Demjanjuk, 612 F. Supp. at 555-58; Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky,
776 F.2d 571, 581-83 (6th Cir. 1985).
117. See supra note 8.
118. Demjanjuk, 776 F.2d at 582-85; In re Extradition of Demjanjuk, 612 F. Supp. at
555-58; see infra notes 146-75 and accompanying text.
119. In re Extradition of Demjanjuk, 612 F. Supp. at 570-71.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 554.
122. Id. at 554-55.
123. Id. at 555.
124. See infra notes 146-75 and accompanying text.
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A.

ISRAELI JURISDICTION UNDER MUNICIPAL LAW

The district court first proposed that Israel's Nazi Statute enables
Israel to assert jurisdiction over Demjanjuk. The Nazi Statute lists the
following as capital offenses: an act constituting a war crime, a crime
against humanity, or a "crime against the Jewish people" committed
in an "enemy country" during the "period of the Nazi regime." 12 5
The Statute then defines "war crimes" and "crimes against humanity"
in a manner consistent with the corresponding definitions contained in
the Charter of the International Military Tribunal (the "Nuremberg
Charter"). 126 The definition of "crimes against the Jewish people" is
based on the Genocide Convention's definition of genocide. 127
Demjanjuk attacked the validity of the Nazi Statute, contending
that it was an impermissible ex post facto law. Although the Statute
was passed in 1950, it declared acts committed between 1933 and 1945
as criminal. In dismissing this argument, the extradition court determined that the Nazi Statute, like the Nuremberg Charter and the
Genocide Convention, did not "declare unlawful what had been lawful
before."' 128 The court held that Demjanjuk's alleged offenses were
criminal when committed, citing international agreements dating from
1899 defining the laws of war and forbidding the killing of defenseless
persons.12 9 The court noted that by 1942, the operation of gas chambers and the torture of unarmed prisoners were illegal under the "laws
and standards of every civilized nation."1 30 The Nazi Statute, like the
Nuremberg Charter and the Genocide Convention, did no more than
restate existing law and provide an additional forum to prosecute
offenders. 131 Thus, because the Nazi Statute was not necessary to
establish the criminality of Demjanjuk's alleged acts, it was not an
125. Nazi Statute, supra note 7, art. l(a).
126. Charter of the International Military Tribunal, Aug. 8, 1945, art. 6, 59 Stat. 1546,
E.A.S. No. 472 [hereinafter Nuremberg Charter].
127. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, opened
for signature Dec. 9, 1948, art. 2, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 [hereinafter Genocide Convention].
Israel was among the first nations to ratify the Genocide Convention. See id. at 278. The
United States did not ratify the Genocide Convention until February, 1986, after the disposition of this case, although it was a signatory at all relevant times. See N.Y. Times, Feb.
20, 1986, at Al, col. 1.
128. In re Extradition of Demjanjuk, 612 F. Supp. 544, 567 (N.D. Ohio 1985). The
judgment of the International Military Tribunal specifically stated that the Nuremberg
Charter was "the expression of international law existing at the time of its creation." The
Nurnberg Trial, 6 F.R.D. 69, 107 (1946). This claim was made to counter the criticism
that the jurisdiction conferred by the Charter was nothing more than an "arbitrary exercise
of power on the part of the victorious nations." Id. In fact, critics of the Nuremberg trial
decry it as the traditional vengeance of the victors dressed in black robes. See, e.g.,
Schwarzenberger, The Judgment of Nuremberg, 21 TUL. L. REv. 329, 338 (1947); Taylor,
Large Questions in the Eichmann Case, N.Y. Times, Jan. 22, 1961, § 6 (Magazine), at 22.
129. In re Extradition of Demjanjuk, 612 F. Supp. at 567.
130. Id.
131. Id.
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impermissible ex post facto law. 132

It is not clear, however, that the crimes of which Demjanjuk
stands accused were considered illegal in 1942. One commentator
maintains that the crimes enumerated in the Nuremberg Charter were
not criminal during World War II because at that time the offenders
could not have been punished for their acts. 133 It is widely acknowledged that even if the acts characterized as "crimes against peace" and
"war crimes" were criminal during the Nazi regime, acts constituting
"crimes against humanity" represented an unprecedented addition to
the list of punishable offenses. 134 Moreover, the Nuremberg Charter
restricted the International Military Tribunal's (the "IMT") jurisdiction over "crimes against humanity" to offenses "committed in execution of or in connection with any crime within the jurisdiction of the
Tribunal." 135 The IMT interpreted this to mean that its jurisdiction

was limited to acts committed after the outbreak of war in 1939.136
The Nazi Statute, however, defined "crimes against humanity" to
include acts committed not only during the War, but throughout the
137
Third Reich.

The Israeli Supreme Court considered the Nazi Statute an

"extraordinary measure" designed to cope with an "extraordinary
event":
This Law is fundamentally different in its characteristics, in the legal and
moral principles underlying it and in its spirit, from all other criminal enactments usually found on the statute books. The Law is retroactive and extraterritorial and its object inter alia is to provide a basis for the punishment of
crimes, which are not comprised within the criminal law of Israel being the
138
special consequence of the Nazi regime and its persecution.

Even so, it is not clear that the Knesset, which enacted the Nazi Statute, necessarily viewed the Holocaust as an unprecedented event. One
commentator has suggested that the legal rationalizations in the Eichmann trial illustrate "how little Israel was prepared to recognize that

the crime Eichmann was accused of was an unprecedented crime. In
132. Baade, The Eichmann Trial: Some Legal Aspects, 1961 DUKE L.J. 400, 412-13;
Note, Eichmann-InternationalLaw?, 24 U. PITT. L. REv. 116, 127 (1962).
133. April, An Inquiry into the JuridicalBasisfor the Nuernberq War Crimes Trial, 30
MINN. L. REv. 313, 320-24 (1946). The "crimes" listed in the Nuremberg Charter were
"crimes against peace" (waging a war of aggression), "war crimes," and "crimes against
humanity." Nuremberg Charter, supra note 126, art. 6.

134. See, eg., H. ARENDT,

EICHMANN IN JERUSALEM

255 (rev. ed. 1964); April, supra

note 133, at 324.
135. Nuremberg Charter, supra note 126, art. 6(c).
136. The Nurnberg Trial, 6 F.R.D. 69, 131 (1946); Baxter, Jurisdiction Over War
Crimes and CrimesAgainstHumanity: Individualand State Accountability, in A TREATISE
ON INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 65, 83 (1973).
137. Baxter, supra note 136, at 84.
138. Fawcett, supra note 7, at 184-85 (quoting Honigman v. Attorney General, [1952]
12 Pesakim 336).
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the eyes of the Jews, the catastrophe that had befallen them under
Hitler appeared not as the most recent of crimes, the unprecedented
crime of genocide, but, on the contrary, as the oldest crime they knew
' 139
and remembered."
Thus, Demjanjuk's alleged acts consist of crimes that Jews have
known for centuries and acts that have only recently gained recognition as crimes in international law. In one sense, the Nazi Statute
addresses a new crime. In another sense, it merely restates the criminality of an ancient crime and provides a forum for its prosecution.
Indisputably, Israel validly asserted jurisdiction over Demjanjuk
under the Nazi Statute. 14° A more difficult question is the validity of
Israel's jurisdiction under international law. In other words, can the
United States justify the extradition of Demjanjuk under international
law?
B.

ISRAELI JURISDICTION UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW

Five theories of jurisdiction exist in international law. 141 "Territoriality", the primary theory, permits a state to assert jurisdiction over
an offense committed within its territory. 142 The "nationality" principle confers jurisdiction over an offender who is a national of the state
seeking jurisdiction. 143 The "protective" principle grants jurisdiction
over offenders who commit acts prejudicial to the vital interests of the
state claiming jurisdiction. 144 Closely related is the theory of "passive
personality" which confers jurisdiction on the ground that the victim
14 5
of the offense is a national of the state exercising jurisdiction.
Finally, the "universality" principle permits a state to exercise jurisdiction regardless of the place of the offense and the nationality of
either the offender or the victim. 14 6 This theory of extraordinary jurisdiction is premised on the notion that certain offenses constitute
crimes against all humanity. Therefore, any state that captures the
139. H. ARENDT, supra note 134, at 245.

140. In re Extradition of Demjanjuk, 612 F. Supp. 544, 555 (N.D. Ohio 1985). Under
Israeli law, Israeli municipal law prevails over international law'where the two conflict.
Israel v. Eichmann, 36 I.L.R. 5 (D.C. Jerusalem 1961) (quotations from Eichmann are
taken from the unofficial translation prepared by the Israeli government for the convenience of the public, reprinted in 56 AM. J. INT'L L. 805, 806-07 (1962); see also Baxter,
supra note 136, at 82; Fawcett, supra note 7, at 184-85.
141. Carnegie, JurisdictionOver Violations of the Laws and Customs of War, 1963 BRrr.
Y.B. INT'L L. 402, 404.
142. Id.
143. Id.

144. Id.
145. Id.

146. Blakesley, A ConceptualFramework for Extradition and Jurisdiction Over Extraterritorial Crime, 1984 UTAH L. REv. 685, 688-717; Carnegie, supra note 141, at 405.
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offender may prosecute him on behalf of the world community.1 47

Each state must act individually to assert jurisdiction under the
universality theory. A state may enact municipal laws which
criminalize offenses against all humanity and empower its courts to
hear such cases. The Israeli Nazi Statute 4 8 represents an example of
this method. Alternatively, states may define their rights and duties

by treaties which allow universal jurisdiction. Examples of this
method include the Geneva Convention of the High Seas 149 and the

1949 Geneva Conventions for the Protection of War Victims. 150
Under the High Seas Convention, any state may seize and try offenders.15 1 Under the 1949 Geneva Conventions, any contracting party is

obligated to try before its own courts any person who has committed a
grave breach of the Conventions' provisions, regardless of the person's

nationality.1 52 Finally, states may set up international tribunals to try
individuals who commit offenses against humanity. The IMT is a
result of this method of asserting jurisdiction under the universality
153
principle.
The Demjanjuk extradition court held that Israel's assertion of

jurisdiction based on the Nazi Statute conforms to the universality
principle of jurisdiction in international law.1 54 The court determined
that the findings of the Nuremberg trial and the post-war trials of
minor war criminals in the occupied zones supported the applicability
of the universality theory.1 55 The court cited United States v. Wal147. 1 M. BAssiouNi, supra note 3, at ch. 6, § 6-1.
148. See supra note 7.
149. Geneva Convention of the High Seas, openedfor signatureApr. 29, 1958, 13 U.S.T.
2312, T.I.A.S. No. 5200, 450 U.N.T.S. 82.
150. Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and
Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, opened for signature Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114,
T.I.A.S. No. 3362, 75 U.N.T.S. 31; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, opened for
signatureAug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, T.I.A.S. No. 3363, 75 U.N.T.S. 85; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, openedfor signatureAug. 12, 1949,
6 U.S.T. 3316, T.I.A.S. No. 3364, 75 U.N.T.S. 135; Geneva Convention Relative to the
Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, openedfor signatureAug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T.
3516, T.I.A.S. No. 3365, 75 U.N.T.S. 287. But cf the Genocide Convention, supra note
127, art. 6 (providing that genocide shall be a universal crime, but confering jurisdiction on
an international tribunal or on the courts of the territory where the genocide was
committed).
151. Geneva Convention of the High Seas, supra note 149, art. 19.
152. Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Convention of the Wounded and
Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, supra note 150, art. 49; Geneva Convention for the
Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed
Forces at Sea, supra note 150, art. 50; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of
Prisoners of War, supra note 150, art. 129; Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection
of Civilian Persons in Time of War, supra note 150, art. 146.
153. 1 M. BASSIOUNI, supra note 3, at ch. 6, § 6-8.
154. In re Extradition of Demjanjuk, 612 F. Supp. 544, 555 (N.D. Ohio 1985).
155. Id. at 557.
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deck, 156 a case involving physicians, guards, and officials from the
Buchenwald concentration camp. The court quoted that case as
follows:
Any violation of the law of nations encroaches upon and injures the interests of
all sovereign states. Whether the power to punish for such crimes will be exercised in a particular case is a matter resting within the discretion of a state.
However, it is axiomatic that a state, adhering to the law of war which forms a
part of the law of nations, is interested in the preservation and the enforcement
thereof. This is true, irrespective of when or where the crime was committed,
the belligerency
status of the punishing power, or the nationality of the
15 7
victims.

The Waldeck formulation of universality jurisdiction exemplified
that of the war crime trials. The district court discussed the trial of
the major war criminals at Nuremberg, noting that the Nuremburg
Court had tried defendants "whose offenses [had] no particular geographical location."158 Citing the Genocide Convention and the
United Nations "Nuremberg Principles," the court concluded universal jurisdiction over war crimes and crimes against humanity had
become well-accepted after the war; thus, extraterritoriality was no
159
bar to Israel's assertion of jurisdiction over Demjanjuk.
The extradition court claimed that "universal condemnation of
the acts involved and general interest in cooperating to suppress them"
establishes the universality principle.1 60 In its classic statement, however, the universality theory encompasses acts committed beyond any
country's territorial jurisdiction, the paradigm offense being piracy on
the high seas. 161 War crimes and crimes against humanity, which
occur within the territorial jurisdiction of a specific country are, therefore, prosecutable in and by such country and are arguably beyond the
reach of the universality theory. The district court, however, citing
the Nuremberg and Eichmann trials, simply stated that the universality principle applies to war crimes and crimes against humanity. This
view is probably correct, but warrants a more thorough examination.
An expanded theory of universal jurisdiction can be reconciled
with its original formulation by examining the basis of the piracy paradigm. Piracy occurs only where there is a "lack of governmental control" in the pirate's area of operation.162 This fact, not the physical
156. No. 000-50-9 (DJAWC Nov. 15, 1947).
157. In re Extradition of Demjanjuk, 612 F. Supp. at 557 (quoting United States v.
Waldeck, No. 000-50-9, slip op. at 34 (DJAWC Nov. 15, 1947).
158. Id. at 556 (quoting The Nurnberg Trial, 6 F.R.D. 69, 76 (1946)).
159. Id. at 557-58.
160. Id.at 556.
161. 1 M. BAssiouNi, supra note 3, at ch. 6, § 6. The justification for the universality
principle lies in the fact that without such jurisdiction, no country could prosecute the
offender.
162. Cowles, Universality of JurisdictionOver War Crimes, 33 CALIF. L. REv. 177, 193
(1945).
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location of the pirate on the high seas, provides the justification for
jurisdiction under the universality principle.1 63 Similarly, war crimes
occur where there is no "adequate judicial system operating," either
1
because of chaotic wartime conditions or irresponsible leadership. 64
Like piracy, war crimes are carried on beyond the boundaries of legal
control, and subject the offender to the jurisdiction of any state that is
able to seize him and bring him to justice. 16 5 Under this analysis, the
universality principle applies to war crimes by analogy to piracy.
Two formulations of the justification for jurisdiction over high
seas pirates exist under the universality principle. First, piracy is a
violation of the law of nations; therefore, any nation may punish the
pirate on behalf of all sovereign states. The law of nations permits, as
an extraordinary ground of jurisdiction, any state to seize and prosecute the pirate regardless of location of the offense. 1 66 Second, piracy
may not violate the law of nations, but rather violates municipal law.
Municipal law defines the parameters of the crime; then, by international agreement, any state may seize the offender and subject him to
167
its municipal law.
If war crimes are analogous to piracy, either formulation of the
universality principle supports Israel's jurisdiction over Demjanjuk.
Either war crimes are crimes against humanity and Israel may prosecute the war criminal on behalf of all nations, or the crimes violate
Israel's municipal law, and are so heinous that international law permits Israel to claim jurisdiction on "extraordinary grounds. 1 68
Based at least partially on the analogy between war crimes and
piracy, the universality principle has expanded during the past four
decades to encompass war crimes and crimes against humanity. By
the time of the Eichmann trial in 1961, war crimes and crimes against
humanity were commonly accepted as crimes of universal jurisdiction.1 69 Universal jurisdiction, however, fails to include every "univer163. Id.
164. Id. at 194; see also E.

JANECZEK, NUREMBERG JUDGMENT IN THE LIGHT OF

INTERNATIONAL LAW 60 (1949).

165. Sponsler, The Universality Principleof Jurisdiction and the Threatened Trials of
American Airmen, 15 Loy. L. REv. 43, 50 (1968).
166. Id. at 45-46.
167. Id.
168. See Note, InternationalLaw: JurisdictionOverExtraterritorialCrime: Universality
Principle: War Crimes: CrimesAgainst Humanity: Piracy: IsraeliNazis and Nazi Collaborators (Punishment)Law, 46 CORNELL L.Q. 326, 330-33 (1961).
169. Baxter, supra note 136, at 83; Carnegie, supra note 141, at 422. For a partial list of
conventions allowing universal jurisdiction, see supra notes 149, 150. Additionally, universal jurisdiction was mandated by the Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural
Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, openedfor signatureMay 14, 1954, art. 28, 249
U.N.T.S. 240.
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sal crime." 170
The Sixth Circuit relied on section 404 of the Restatement of For-.
17 1
eign Relations Law to uphold Israel's jurisdiction over Demjanjuk.
Section 404 provides:
A state may exercise jurisdiction to define and punish certain offenses recognized by the community of nations as of universal concern, such as piracy,
slave trade, attacks on or hijacking of aircraft, genocide, war crimes, and perhaps terrorism, even where none of the bases of jurisdiction indicated in § 402
172
is present.

Comment "a" to Section 404 states that the listed offenses are subject
to universal jurisdiction "as a matter of customary law," even for
173
states "not party to any international agreement on the subject."
Similarly, the Sixth Circuit relied on the Restatement and the
universality theory to explain why Israel had jurisdiction over
Demjanjuk notwithstanding its lack of statehood at the time of his
alleged crimes. 174 Because the universality principle provides that
crimes against humanity may be punished by one country on behalf of
all, "Israel or any other nation, regardlessof its status in 1942 or 1943,
may undertake to vindicate the interest of all nations by seeking to
punish the perpetrators of such crimes."' 75 The district court, on the
other hand, resorted to a complicated discussion of the successor state
theory. 176

The district court briefly discussed two other jusridictional theo-

ries. First, the court suggested that Israel could assert jurisdiction
based on the protective principle, which permits a country to assert

jurisdiction over extraterritorial conduct by non-nationals, when the

17 7
conduct is directed against the state's security or vital interests.
The court, however, failed to explain how the theory might apply to
Israel's attempt to try Demjanjuk. Second, the court noted that
although Demjanjuk's alleged victims were not Israeli nationals, their

170. See, eg., Genocide Convention, supra note 127, which makes no provision for universal jurisdiction. But see RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 404 reporter's
note 1 (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1981) (stating that an "international crime is presumably subject
to universal jurisdiction.").
171. Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky, 776 F.2d 571, 572 (6th Cir. 1985).
172. RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 404 (rent. Draft No. 6, 1984).
The jurisdictional bases in § 402 are the territoriality, nationality, and protective principles.
Id. at § 402.
173. Id. at § 404 comment a. The reporter's notes acknowledge that war crimes and
genocide are subject to universal jurisdiction and will probably be joined by other offenses
as customary law continues to evolve.
174. Demjanjuk, 776 F.2d at 582-83.
175. Id. at 583 (emphasis added). This mirrors the post-war U.S. position regarding the
jurisdiction of U.S. military courts to try war criminals who committed offenses prior to the
United States' entry into the war. REPORT OF THE DEPUTY JUDGE ADVOCATE FOR WAR
CRIMES EUROPEAN COMMAND, JUNE 1944-JuLY 1948, at 58.
176. See infra note 184.
177. In re Extradition of Demjanjuk, 612 F. Supp. 544, 558 & n.13 (N.D. Ohio 1985).

306

CORNELL INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 20:281

"close nexus" with Israel might enable Israel to assert jurisdiction
178
based on the passive personality theory.

For more than two decades, these two theories had justified
Israel's jurisdiction over Adolph Eichmann. The Eichmann court formulated the protective principle as the right of the "victim nation...
to try any who assault [its] existence." 179 Quoting numerous legal
authorities, the court found that the protective principle, and, by
extension, the passive personality principle, applied when there is a
"linking point" between the punisher and the accused, and where the
acts of the accused concern the punishing state more so than other
states.18 0 Noting the character of the crimes charged and the unique

character of the State of Israel as a country established as a haven for
survivors of the Holocaust, the Eichmann court found a very "special
u8
tragic link.'

Some writers criticized the Eichmann court's formulation of the
protective and passive personality theories on the grounds that Israel
was not a sovereign state during the Nazi regime and Eichmann's vic-

tims, therefore, were not Israeli nationals. 182 The Eichmann district
court, aware of his problem, presented a very formalistic argument

about the rights of a successor state.18 3 The Demjanjuk court
advanced a similar argument. 18 4 The Eichmann court did address the
underlying justification for the applicability of the protective and pas-

sive personality theories:
The right of the "hurt" group to punish offenders derives directly... from the
crime committed against them by the offender, and it was only want of sovereignty that denied them the power to try and punish the offender. If the hurt
group or people thereafter reaches political sovereignty in any territory, it may
make use of such sovereignty for the enforcement of its natural right to punish
the offender who hurt them ....
178. Id.
179. Israel v. Eichmann, 36 I.L.R. 5 (D.C. Jerusalem 1961), reprinted in 56 AM. J.
INT'L L. 805, 828 (1962).
180. Id at 829, 832.
181. Id at 830-32.
182. See, eg., Fawcett, supra note 7, at 190-192.
183. Israel v. Eichmann, 36 I.L.R. 5 (D.C. Jerusalem 1961), reprinted in 56 AM. J.
INT'L L. at 832-34.
184. According to the successor state theory, municipal laws remain in effect after a
change in government until the new government acts to amend or repeal them. The Israeli
criminal law prohibiting murder incorporates the Criminal Code in effect in Palestine during the period of the British Mandate. Israel, as the successor state to Palestine, can try
persons for murders committed during the Mandate. Had the British Mandatory Power
enacted a law providing for the prosecution of extraterritorial war crimes (including murder), Israel, as successor state, would be competent to try persons violating that law. The
rights of the successor state include the ability to amend or supplement retroactively the
preceding legislation, and to provide for the prosecution of crimes for which legislation
could have provided. In re Extradition of Demjanjuk, 612 F. Supp. 544, 567-68 (N.D. Ohio
1985).
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The State of Israel, the sovereign State of the Jewish people, performs
through its legislation the task of carrying into effect the right of the Jewish
people to punish the criminals who killed their sons with intent to put an end
185
to the survival of this people.

The court's interpretation of these two theories clearly illustrated
their applicability to Eichmann. Although objections to these jurisdictional theories may have been technically correct, they tended to
"obscure the decisive fact that Jews were regarded as a nation by the
Nazis,"'' 8 6 and that the Jews had been killed as Jews. 18 7 Not only did
Israel, as the territorial state of the Jews, have a greater interest in
Nazi atrocities than did any of the other eighteen states that had jurisdiction under the territoriality principle, but the citizens of Israel had
perhaps as much right to punish crimes committed against their people as states which punish crimes committed within their territory.
The Demjanjuk court unfortunately failed to consider fully the
protective and passive personality theories. Both theories complement
the universality argument. Whereas the universality theory grants
jurisdiction to any country, including Israel, to try alleged war
criminals, the protective and passive personality theories give Israel
alone jurisdiction to try Nazi war criminals. Moreover, the protective
and passive personality theories illuminate the measure of revenge and
self-assertion that underlies Israel's insistence on trying individuals
like Eichmann and Demjanjuk. As the Israeli Supreme Court stated:
The punishments meted out in the law [the Nazi Statute] were not intended
principally to reform the criminal or to deter potential criminals, but ratheras the title of the law itself indicates--"to
take revenge" on the enemies of
188
Israel and the destroyers of Israel.

Notwithstanding Israel's ultimate motives, it is difficult to argue
that Israel lacks jurisdiction over Demjanjuk under accepted principles of international law. In the past four decades, war crimes and
crimes against humanity have been widely recognized as international
offenses subject to universal jurisdiction. 18 9 In addition, given the
unique nature of the crimes charged and the close nexus between the
accused, the victims, and Israel, the protective and passive personality
theories of jurisdiction govern the Demjanjuk case. 190
185. Israel v. Eichmann, 36 I.L.R. 5 (D.C. Jerusalem 1961), reprinted in 56 AM. J.
INT'L. L. at 834.

186. Note, supra note 132, at 130.
187. Id.
188. Comment, Fedorenko v. United States: War Crimes, the Defense of Duress, and
American NationalityLaw, 82 COLUM. L. REv. 120, 150 & n.95 (1982) (quoting Honigman
v. Attorney General, 7 Piskei Din 296, 304 Isr. (1953), 18 I.L.R. 542-43 (1953)).
189. See supra notes 154-76 and accompanying text.
190. See supra notes 177-81 and accompanying text.
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THE POLITICAL OFFENSE EXCEPTION

A. THE DEMJANJUK CASE: WAR CRIMES AND
CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY

Although the district court considered it only briefly and the
Sixth Circuit did not address it at all, the applicability of the political
offense exception is an interesting and potentially significant aspect of
the Demjanjuk case. Demjanjuk raised the exception as a defense,
claiming that the alleged acts, if committed, had been incidental to the
ongoing Nazi war effort. 19 ' The court rejected Demjanjuk's claim,
stating that "[tlhe murdering of numerous civilians while a guard in a
Nazi concentration camp, as part of a larger 'Final Solution' to exterminate religious or ethnic groups, is not a crime of a 'political character' and thus is not covered by the political offense exception to
1 92
extradition."
The political offense exception evolved as extradition shifted from
a mechanism used against political dissenters to a device used against
perpetrators of common crimes.19 3 The exception has three justifications: 1) that political dissent and activism should exist in democratic
societies; 2) that humanitarian considerations militate against extraditing unsuccessful dissenters if the requesting state is likely to subject
them to unfair trials and punishment; and 3) that no government
should facilitate the punishment of political acts committed against
another state, if such acts do not harm its own internal political
order. 194
In the absence of any treaty-based definition of the term "political
offense," courts have devised various tests to determine whether a particular act falls within the exception. Two categories of political
offenses have emerged: "pure" political offenses and "relative" political offenses.1 95 Pure political offenses are "acts directed against the
state that contain none of the elements of an ordinary crime."' 196
Examples are treason, espionage, and sedition.1 97 A relative political
offense is an offense in which "a common crime is so connected with a
191. In re Extradition of Demjanjuk, 612 F. Supp. 544, 569-70 (N.D. Ohio 1985).
192. Id at 571.
193. Quinn v. Robinson, 783 F.2d 776, 792-93 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, - U.S. -,
107 S. Ct. 271 (1987). This shift occurred in the aftermath of the American and French
Revolutions as the concept of justified political resistance gained legitimacy. Id
194. Id at 793; see also Deere, PoliticalOffenses in the Law and PracticeofExtradition,
27 AM. J. INT'L L. 247, 249 (1933); Note, State Department Determinationsof Political
Offenses: Death Knellfor the PoliticalOffense Exception in ExtraditionLaw, 15 CASE W.
REs. J. INT'L L. 137, 138-39 (1983).
195. Quinn, 783 F.2d at 793; see also Garcia-Mora, The Nature of PoliticalOffenses: A
Knotty Problem of Extradition Law, 48 VA. L. REV.1226, 1230-31 (1962).
196. Garcia-Mora, supra note 195, at 1230.
197. Eain v. Wilkes, 641 F. 2d 504, 512 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 894 (1981).
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political act that the entire offense is regarded as political." 19 8 United
States courts apply an incidence test to determine whether "the nexus
between the crime and the political act is sufficiently close" for the
crime to be deemed a relative political offense. 199 The test focuses on
whether a "violent political disturbance" existed at the time of the
alleged acts and whether the acts charged were "recognizably incidental to the disturbance. ' '2°° Generally, U.S. courts have read the incidence test loosely, including even murder and robbery within its scope
so long as the accused demonstrates some link with a political
uprising. 20 1

The incidence test has produced some anomalous results, most
notably in the first Artukovic extradition case. 20 2 In that case, Yugoslavia sought the extradition of Andrija Artukovic, former Minister of
the Interior of the Independent State of Croatia, the puppet state
formed by the Nazis after their 1941 invasion of Yugoslavia.20 3 Yugoslavia charged Artukovic with complicity in the murders of over
700,000 civilians from 1941 through 1943.20 4 Before an extradition
hearing was held, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the issuance of a writ of
habeas corpus on the ground that the alleged offenses were of a "political character, ' 20 5 and reflected a "marked degree of connection
between the alleged murders and a political element. ' 20 6 The court
rejected the argument that the common crime element of "war
crimes" negated any political character of Artukovic's alleged
crimes. 20 7 The court also rejected the government's claim that the
United States was obligated to extradite Artukovic pursuant to various
198. Garcia-Mora,supra note 195, at 1230-31.
199. Quinn, 783 F.2d at 794.
200. In re Extradition of Demjanjuk, 612 F. Supp. 544, 570 (N.D. Ohio 1985); Eain, 641
F.2d at 516.
201. See, eg., In re Mackin, No. 80 Cr. Misc. 1 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 13, 1981), appeal dismissed, 668 F.2d 122, 130-37 (2d Cir. 1981) (murder of British soldier in Northern Ireland
deemed a political offense); In re McMullen, No. 3-78-1099 MG (N.D. Cal. May 11, 1979)
(murder resulting from bombing of military barracks in England took place during state of
uprising in the United Kingdom); In re Ezeta, 62 F. 972, 976 (N.D. Cal. 1894) (murder and
robbery closely identified with an uprising as part of an unsuccessful effort to suppress it).
202. Artukovic v. Boyle, 140 F. Supp. 245 (S.D. Cal. 1956); see also Karadzole v.
Artukovic, 247 F.2d 198 (9th Cir. 1957), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 355 U.S.
393 (1958), on remand, United States ex rel Karadzole v. Artukovic, 170 F. Supp. 383
(S.D. Cal. 1959). Artukovic has since been extradited to Yugoslavia following that country's submission of a second extradition request. In re Extradition of Artukovic, No.
CV84-8743-R(B) (C.D. Cal. Mar. 4, 1985).
A requesting government is not barred from reinstituting extradition proceedings if its
original request is denied. Collins v. Loisel, 262 U.S. 426 (1923); Hooker v. Klein, 573 F.2d
1360 (9th Cir. 1978).
203. Artukovic, 140 F. Supp. at 246-47.
204. Ma at 247.
205. Karadzole, 247 F.2d at 204.

206. Id.
207. Id. at 204-05.

310

CORNELL INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 20:281

United Nations resolutions.2 0 8
The United States Supreme Court vacated the Ninth Circuit's
decision and remanded the case to the district court for a full-scale
extradition hearing under 18 U.S.C. § 3184.209 In the subsequent decision, the extradition magistrate found no probable cause that
Artukovic was guilty of murder and participation in murder. 210 The
magistrate discussed the political offense exception in dicta, noting
that it would have barred Artukovic's extradition even if the requisite
probable cause had been present. 2 11
Artukovic is "one of the most roundly criticized cases in the history of American extradition jurisprudence. ' 212 The Ninth Circuit
recently acknowledged its erroneous application of the incidence test
in that case, stating that crimes against humanity are beyond the
21 3
ambit of the political offense exception.
The overwhelming majority of post-war literature asserts that
crimes against humanity (and in many cases, war crimes) are excluded
from the category of protected political offenses because their "barbarity [is] out of proportion to the political end in view."' 2 14 Such crimes
violate international law and, even if committed during a time of war
or violent political uprising, have "no connection with furthering the
legitimate policy of the State. 215 The taking of human life in "gas
chambers, before firing squads, or in laboratories dedicated to vicious
208. Id[
209. Karadzole v. Artukovic, 355 U.S. 393 (1958).
210. United States ex rel Karadzole v. Artukovic, 170 F. Supp. 383, 388 (S.D. Cal.
1959).
211. Id. at 392-93.
212. Eain v. Wilkes, 641 F.2d 504, 522 (7th Cir.), cerL denied, 454 U.S. 894 (1981).
213. Quinn v. Robinson, 783 F.2d 776, 799 (9th Cir. 1986), cert denied,- U.S. -., 107
S. Ct. 271 (1987). According to the Quinn court, it was irrelevant that the crimes charged
may also have been war crimes, some of which might be considered protected political
offenses. The Quinn court also noted the intersection of the political offense doctrine and
the "act of state" doctrine and raised, but did not answer, the question of whether crimes
against humanity, often committed by government officials, are shielded by the immunity
conferred upon state officials in the courts of another state. Id. at 800-01. In Demjanjuk's
case, however, the potential confluence of the two doctrines is inapposite, as Demjanjuk can
hardly be considered to have acted in any official capacity. Demjanjuk's case differs from
that of Artukovic, who was arguably protected because of his official position. Indeed, the
Seventh Circuit found this to be the only plausible justification for the Artukovic result. See
Eain, 641 F.2d at 522. The act of state doctrine was explicitly rejected by the Eichmann
courts as it had been by the International Military Tribunal. See The Nurnberg Trial, 6
F.R.D. 69, 110-11 (1946); Israel v. Eichmann, 36 I.L.R. 5 (D.C. Jerusalem 1961), reprinted
in 56 AM. J. INT'L L. 805, 824-27 (1962); Note, supra note 132, at 124.

214. Garcia-Mora, The PresentStatus of PoliticalOffenses in the Law ofExtraditionand

Asylum, 14 U. Prrr. L. REv. 371, 396 (1953). Genocide is expressly excluded from the
category of protected political offenses by Article 7 of the Genocide Convention. Genocide
Convention, supra note 127, art. 7.

215. Garcia-Mora, Crimes Against Humanity and the Principle of Nonextradition of
PoliticalOffenders, 62 MICH. L. REv. 927, 944 (1964).
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medical experiments, is murder. '2 16 Such common crimes are unprotected by the political offense exception.
The Demjanjuk court adopted this position regarding the political
offense exception, although it never expressly adopted a per se exclusion for crimes against humanity.2 17 Rather, the court found that the
mass murder of civilians at Treblinka could not be characterized as
part of a political disturbance or struggle for power within the Third
Reich. 2 18 Although the court never explicitly applied the incidence
test, the alleged offenses would nevertheless have failed to qualify as
protected political acts. 21 9 The court found the requisite nexus
between the alleged offenses and the Nazi war effort lacking, irrespective of whether a "violent political disturbance" existed in Eastern
0
Europe in 1942-43.22
B.

AFTER DEMJANJUK: IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FUTURE

Demjanjuk raises considerable uncertainty as to whether other
crimes will be excluded completely from the protection of the political
offense exception. While perhaps laudable, the wholesale exclusion of
crimes against humanity threatens the continued viability of the political offense exception. This is particularly important given the increasingly difficult distinction between legitimate political activity and
terrorism. Terrorism, like crimes against humanity, elicits reactions of
outrage and horror. Moreover, terrorism continues to gain recognition as an international crime. Because of these similarities, it is useful
to consider how legal developments regarding crimes against humanity may portend developments in terrorism cases.
Several recent extradition cases suggest parallels between crimes
against humanity and acts of terrorism. Courts examining acts of terrorism tend to invoke the imagery of ruthless attacks against innocent
civilians and to allude to the dangers of a broad definition of the political offense exception. In Eain v. Wilkes, 221 the Seventh Circuit
refused to grant a writ of habeas corpus to a member of the Palestine
Liberation Organization ("PLO"). Israel charged the PLO member
with planting a bomb in a market in Tiberias that killed two boys and
wounded thirty other people. In refusing to apply the political offense
exception, the court rejected the argument that a "random bombing
intended to result in the cold-blooded murder of civilians [was] inci216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.

Id. at 950.
In re Extradition of Demjanjuk, 612 F. Supp. 544, 570-71 (N.D. Ohio 1985).
Id.
See id. at 570.
Id.
641 F.2d 504 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 894 (1981).
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dental to the purpose of toppling a government. ' 222 The court
adopted a per se test: violent attacks against defenseless civilians are
not protected by the exception regardless of their underlying political
22 3
objective.
The District Court for the Southern District of New York
accepted this new articulation of the incidence test in the case of In re
Doherty.224 The court stated that "not every act committed for a
political purpose or during a political disturbance may or should properly be regarded as a political offense."' 225 Like the Eain court, the
Doherty court signalled its willingness to judge the legitimacy of political struggles in determining the applicability of the political offense
exception. In addition, the Doherty court construed the political
offense exception to exclude acts whose nature "is such as to be violative of international law and inconsistent with international standards
of civilized conduct, ' 226 noting that any other construction of the
political offense exception would sweep in the "atrocities at Dachau,
Auschwitz and other death camps." 227
The recent Ninth Circuit decision in Quinn v. Robinson228
rejected the Eain-Doherty reformulation of the incidence test.229 Stating that the application of the incidence test should be "ideologically
neutral," the Quinn court objected to an extradition court's inquiry
into the legitimacy of an actor's motives and to a determination of
political legitimacy based on the actor's tactics.2 30 The court
222. Id at 521.
223. Id Aside from the blanket characterization of a violent attack on civilians as aper
se unprotected act, the Eain court imposed two other limitations on the incidence test:
first, that a "political uprising" is restricted to a struggle between "organized, nondispersed
military forces," thus excluding the PLO from the definition; and second, that certain acts
lack "political legitimacy" and therefore fall outside the scope of the exception. Id. at 51920. The District Court for the Southern District of New York rejected the first of these
limitations but accepted the second in In re Doherty, 599 F. Supp. 270, 276 (S.D.N.Y.
1984). The Ninth Circuit rejected both limitations in Quinn v. Robinson, 783 F.2d 776,
807-09 (9th Cir. 1986), cert denied,- U.S. -, 107 S. Ct. 271 (1987); see infra notes 22835 and accompanying text.
224. 599 F. Supp. 270 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
225. Id at 274. The court ultimately found that Doherty could not be extradited
because he had committed a protected political offense. Id. Doherty subsequently designated the Republic of Ireland as his country of deporatation under 8 U.S.C. § 1253(a)
(1982) and demanded immediate deportation. Doherty's demand was a consequence of the
Supplementary Extradition Treaty between the United States and the United Kingdom,
which retroactively eliminates the political offense exception. See Doherty v. Meese, 808
F.2d 938 (2d Cir. 1986) (affirming denial of habeas corpus).
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. 783 F.2d 776 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 107 S.Ct. 271 (1987).
229. Id at 808.
230. Id. at 804. In fact, ideological neutrality may not be required. Recent commentary
suggests that a standard of political justifiability based on democratic ideals must be read
into the "superficially neutral language" of the political offense exception, as the exception
was designed specifically to recognize the "citizen's right to revolt against tyrannicalgov-
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expressed confidence that the traditional incidence test, if correctly
applied, would exclude both crimes against humanity and terrorist
acts from the political offense doctrine. Regarding the former, the
court simply stated that crimes against humanity are "treated differently and are generally excluded from the protection of many normally applicable rules, [and are] certainly . . . to be excluded from
coverage under the political offense exception."' 231 Regarding terrorism, the court's lengthy analysis hinged on its interpretation of the
"uprising" component of the incidence test. According to the court,
the political offense exception properly protects
[t]hose engaged in internal or domestic struggles over the form or composition
of their own government, including, of course, struggles to displace an occupying power. It was not designed to protect international political coercion or
blackmail, or the exportation of violence and strife to other locations-even to
232
the homeland of an oppressor nation.

Thus, the exception only applies to a revolt by an indigenous population against its own government or an occupying power, when those
engaged in violence seek to accomplish a fundamental political

objective.
Although the Quinn court's formulation of the political offense

doctrine as it applies to terrorism is bound to be controversial, it confirms the Demjanjuk position regarding crimes against humanity.
Moreover, Quinn avoided a critical failing of Eain and Doherty,
namely, the blurring of the line between crimes against humanity and
acts of political expression that have a reasonable claim to legitimacy

notwithstanding the courts' disagreement with the means employed
and the sentiments expressed. Under any test, crimes against human-

ity must by their nature be excluded from the political offense exception. The Quinn court urged other courts evaluating terrorist acts to
avoid making political judgments that affect the political offense analysis. 233 Thus, courts should not limit the political offense exception to
acts that are "blows struck in the cause of freedom against a regressive
totalitarian regime" in the tradition of the American and French revolutions. 2 34 Furthermore, however repulsive, modem revolutionary

tactics, including random acts of violence against civilians, should not
ernment." Note, PoliticalLegitimacy in the Law of PoliticalAsylum, 99 HARV. L. REv.
450, 455 (1985) (footnote omitted) (emphasis in original).
231. Quinn, 783 F.2d at 801.
232. Id. at 807. The court held that Quinn, a member of the Irish Republican Army,
could be extradited on charges that he murdered a London police constable. The court
found that although an "uprising" existed in Northern Ireland at the time of the charged
offenses, no uprising existed in England, where the alleged crime was committed. Furthermore, the crimes "did not take place within a territorial entity in which a group of nationals were seeking to change the form of the government under which they live." Id. at 818.
233. Id. at 803-08.
234. Id. at 804 (citing In re Gonzalez, 217 F. Supp. 717, 721 n.9 (S.D.N.Y. 1963)).
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be presumed politically illegitimate. 235
Under the Quinn analysis, Demjanjuk's crimes are not protected
political offenses because the political offense exception excludes
crimes against humanity. Even without this straightforward exclusion, however, Demjanjuk's alleged crimes do not meet the incidence
test. The Treblinka murders were not committed in the course of a
revolt by an indigenous population against a government or an occupying power. No "uprising" existed as defined in Quinn;236 therefore,
it is irrelevant that the Treblinka crimes were committed during
World War II.
Despite the clear inapplicability of the political offense exception
to Demjanjuk, both the decision of the extradition court and Quinn
suggest that the blanket exclusion of crimes against humanity may be
somewhat troublesome. Both courts premised the exclusion of crimes
against humanity on a characterization of those crimes as violative of
2 37
international law and international standards of civilized conduct.
Yet crimes against humanity have only recently been recognized as
international offenses; indeed, one commentator noted that the drafters of the Nuremberg Charter developed the concept of crimes against
humanity primarily because no other legal way existed to punish the
Nazis for offenses committed against other Germans and stateless persons living in Nazi-occupied territory. 238 Thus, certain offenses may
be deemed international crimes when the world community becomes
sufficiently outraged to make a concerted effort to punish them. The
designation of certain crimes as international presumes that nations
should and will intervene in the affairs of other sovereign states when
such crimes occur. Yet, one of the major justifications for the political
offense exception is to insure that sovereign states do not interfere with
each others' internal affairs. The recent effort to expand the category
of international crimes to include aircraft hijacking, narcotics trafficking, and possibly terrorism, 2 39 necessarily implies a corresponding narrowing of the political offense exception. It remains to be seen whether
the continuing expansion of international criminal law will intrude
unacceptably on the traditional right of political actors to seek asylum
free from the threat of extradition.
235. Id. at 804-05.
236. See id. at 811-14.
237. Id. at 799; In re Extradition of Demjanjuk, 612 F. Supp. 544, 571 (N.D. Ohio

1985).

238. E. JANECZEK, supra note 164, at 97.
239. See, eg., Blakesley, supra note 146; Kittrie, Patriotsand Terrorists: Reconciling
Human Rights with World Order, 13 CASE W. REs. . INT'L L. 291 (1981); RESTATEMENT
OF FoRIGN RELATIONS LAW § 404 comment a (Tent. Draft No. 2 1981).
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VI.

CONCLUSION

Demjanjuk confirms the character of crimes against humanity
and war crimes as offenses subject to universal jurisdiction. The case
also confirms the exclusion of these crimes from the coverage of the
political offense exception. Demjanjuk, however, raises serious questions regarding the scope of both the universality principle of jurisdiction and the political offense exception. The steady expansion of the
category of international crimes subject to universal jurisdiction and
the concurrent position of at least one court that such crimes areperse
excluded from the political offense exception means that an increasing
number of relative political offenses will be subject to the extraordinary reach of universal jurisdiction. Moreover, they may also lose the
protection afforded by the political offense exception. Given that there
appears to be no discernible limit to the acts that may fall into this
category, it is possible that acts considered critical to the survival of
political dissent may some day not only be prosecutable by any state,
but wholly unprotected by the political offense exception. At such
time the freedom to engage in anything but orthodox political protest
will effectively vanish.

